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School of East Asian Studies, University of Sheffield 
 
Abstract  This article analyses changes in the provision of Japanese occupational 
pensions since the early 2000s. It shows how Japanese companies have followed 
strategies of cost and risk reduction by creating multi-layered benefit systems that offer a 
combination of defined benefit and defined contribution plans whose benefits are 
becoming increasingly performance-oriented. Analyzing the reasons behind the 
resilience of defined benefit schemes in Japan, the article concludes that enterprise union 
behaviour has had less influence than regulatory issues and continued corporate 
commitment to long-standing employment practices for regular workers. These findings 
highlight the embeddedness of Japanese employment practices in their institutional 
context. 
 
Keywords  Occupational pensions; performance-related pay; seniority; labour unions; 
government regulation; convergence; varieties of capitalism; Japan. 
 
Introduction 
 
One of the central debates in the management literature centres on the issue of 
convergence or non-convergence of business and management practices across 
countries (Degg and Jackson 2007). According to the proponents of the convergence 
school, increasing global competition forces companies to adopt best practices that are 
universally valid and applicable. This development contributes to a cross-national 
convergence of practices, an erosion of institutional differences among different 
national economies, and a trend towards more market-oriented institutions (e.g. Lane 
1995; Kerr et al. 1962). In contrast, proponents of the non-convergence school stress 
the embeddedness of national management practices in their cultural and institutional 
context, with the comparative capitalism (CC) literature elucidating the institutional 
foundations of diverse national ‘varieties’ of business organization. According to this 
school, existing complementarities among institutional elements of national 
economies tend to thwart international convergence (e.g. Degg and Jackson 2007; 
Hall and Soskice 2001; Whitely 1999; Hollingsworth and Boyer 1997). 
Against the backdrop of this debate, the case of Japan offers interesting 
insights. A large body of literature has highlighted the special nature and 
embeddedness of Japan’s business and employment practices (‘The Japanese Model’), 
characterizing the country as a coordinated market economy as opposed to liberal 
market economies such as the US and UK (e.g. Vogel 2006; Hall and Soskice 2001; 
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Dore 2000). However, recent research has established that Japanese firms have 
changed rapidly since the 1990s (e.g. Aoki, Jackson and Miyajima 2007; Vogel 2006; 
Inagami and Whittaker 2005). For example, main bank relationships, corporate 
finance and governance patterns as well as inter-firm relationships have undergone 
considerable transformations. These changes have raised the question whether 
Japanese firms are adopting practices that are predominant in liberal market 
economies or whether new models may be emerging.  
The purpose of this article is to contribute to this debate through an analysis of 
changes in occupational pension provision in medium- and large-sized Japanese firms 
since the early 2000s. Japanese occupational pensions are for two reasons a fruitful 
subject of research in this debate: first, occupational pensions are an important part of 
Japanese compensation systems and have been closely linked to seniority-oriented 
pay practices as an important feature of the Japanese employment system; second, 
Japanese occupational pensions are, as in many other countries, highly regulated by 
the state and have been institutionally integrated with the public pension system. 
Changes in these arrangements are thus significant for our understanding of the nature 
of evolving interdependencies and reconfigured relationships of Japanese firms with 
institutions inside and outside the firm. 
The key argument this article develops is that in the field of Japanese 
occupational pensions we cannot witness changes that point to a convergence towards 
approaches that characterize the provision of occupational pensions in liberal market 
economies, with the US and the UK as the two major representatives. Defined 
benefit-type pensions have rapidly declined in the US and the UK and have also lost 
some of their importance in Japan in recent years. However, while this might indicate 
a somewhat similar trend, there is strong evidence that Japanese occupational 
pensions are evolving very differently than those in the US and UK. In Japan, defined 
benefit schemes are now frequently becoming part of newly evolving multi-layered 
retirement benefit systems that reflect increasingly employee performance indicators. 
Furthermore, we find a growing diversity of benefit systems, highlighting a growing 
heterogeneity across firms within the economy. 
 To examine these issues, this article proceeds as follows. Following a short 
overview of the study design, the article reviews first the literature on the “Japanese 
Model” and recent changes in Japanese compensation practices. This is followed by 
an overview of the literature regarding employers’ interest in paying occupational 
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pensions, highlighting recent trends in pension provision in the US and UK. The next 
section discusses shortly the Japanese retirement benefit systems before they 
underwent the changes that are the focus of this article. At the heart of the article, the 
findings section analyzes the nature of and the reasons behind the newly evolving 
retirement benefit systems, before it finishes with a short overall assessment. 
 
Study design   
 
Besides Japanese secondary statistical, ministerial and academic sources, this article is 
primarily based on an analysis of semi-structured interviews with human resource 
managers of medium- and large-sized Japanese companies, labor union officials, 
experts in governmental and semi-governmental institutions, actuaries, as well as 
pension and human resource management experts from research and academic 
institutions. To avoid a sector bias, specialists were chosen from both manufacturing 
(automobile, electronics) and servicing industries (transport, utilities). Whenever 
possible, statements and assessments where crosschecked against those of other 
informants and secondary sources. The one to two hour-long interviews were, with 
one exception, conducted in Japanese with 22 informants at 15 locations in April 2009. 
Two of the informants are members of the official eight-member ‘Occupational 
Pension Research Group’ (Kigyō Nenkin Kenkyūkai), established by the director-
general of the Pension Bureau of the Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare to discuss 
and advise the government on issues of occupational pension reform (see the 
appendix for the anonymous list of informants).  
 
Literature review 
 
The “Japanese model” and changes in compensation practices 
 
Japanese firms have long been noted for institutional features that set them apart from 
their counterparts in western industrialized countries (Abegglen 1958). These unique 
features have been found in inter-firm relationships, finance and corporate governance 
patterns and employment practices (e.g. Vogel 2006). The Comparative Capitalism 
(CC) literature has elucidated how interaction effects and complementarities among 
such institutional features shape the behavior of firms and create diverse national 
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‘varieties’ of business organizations (Deeg and Jackson 2007). In this literature, Japan 
has been characterized as a coordinated market economy as opposed to liberal market 
economies such as the US and UK (e.g. Vogel 2006; Hall and Soskice 2001; Dore 
2000). In particular, the so-called ‘three pillars of the Japanese employment system’, 
namely seniority-oriented pay, (life-time) long-term employment and enterprise-based 
unions have been identified as important characteristics of the ‘Japanese Model’ (e.g. 
Debroux 2003). It has been shown how seniority-oriented pay and long-term 
employment practices have been highly complementary with dominant work practices 
such as frequent job rotations, broad job descriptions, teamwork and on-the-job 
training. The long-term nature of these employment practices has had a natural 
equivalent in long-term inter-firm relationships and companies have been in a position 
to follow such practices because shareholders have traditionally not pursued short-
term profit maximization strategies (Aoki 1988).  
 While the CC literature has strong merits explaining such interactions at the 
national level, it has been criticized for its rather static nature and failure to explain 
changes within national models (Deeg and Jackson 2007). In particular, it has been 
challenged by proponents of a convergence thesis who predicate an erosion of 
institutional differences among different countries and a trend towards more market-
oriented institutions due to rapid internationalization of economic activity and the 
resulting cost pressures (e.g. Lane 1995; Kerr et al. 1962). 
With regard to Japanese compensation practices one author has explicitly 
subscribed to the convergence thesis. Comparing changes in pay systems in Japan and 
the UK since the mid-1990s, Suda concludes that Japanese systems have converged 
towards UK market-based practices (2007). The key features of this change are a 
stronger reliance on performance-related pay, the introduction of job factors to 
establish more concrete and objective standards to judge grade and pay levels, and the 
introduction of market factors to increase the objectivity of pay determination.  
Within Suda’s theoretical framework about fundamental differences between 
pay systems, her conclusions about convergent developments are credible. However, 
her approach highlights some important theoretical aspects of the convergence debate 
that are easily overlooked. First, similar trends are not identical with convergence. 
Convergence in the strictest sense requires that the developments of a variable in 
different countries point towards a common end point so that we can witness a 
consistent diminution of variance over time (Wood et al. 2009; Mayrhofer and 
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Brewster 2005). Second, the interpretation of whether a development is convergent 
depends heavily on the choice, definition and degree of aggregation of the researched 
variables. For example, Jacoby (2005) has argued that while employment and pay 
policies in Japan and the US are moving towards a market-orientated model, their 
differences are actually widening since the US is transforming at a quicker speed than 
Japan. Furthermore, there is substantial evidence that within-country variation in 
employment practices is growing in many industrialized countries, including Japan, 
the US and UK (Jacoby 2005; Katz and Darbishire 2000). 
With regard to changes in Japanese compensation practices, most authors 
(Conrad 2010; Keizer 2009; Nakamura 2006; Jacoby 2005; NRSKKK 2006; Shibata 
2000), while agreeing with Suda’s (2007) basic findings about a shift towards 
stronger performance-based pay in Japan, tend to stress important continuities and, 
most importantly, find a growing diversity of methods such as MBO forms, job-based 
pay and competence pay that contradict the convergence thesis for developments 
within Japan. Moreover, they conclude that the adoption of performance-oriented pay 
remains modest and that most firms have limited performance-related pay to more 
senior employees, while ability and age continue to be important criteria for pay 
determination of younger workers so as to maintain existing complementarities with 
practices such as job rotations, teamwork and on-the-job training. What we are 
witnessing since the 1990s is therefore not a growing uniformity of pay practices 
towards one (liberal-market) model, but rather a growing diversity and hybridization 
of practices where a performance-related pay component is often added as yet another 
layer to already highly complex pay determination systems. Following Jacoby (2005) 
we can describe this hybridization as a result of path-dependent developments, 
according to which national economies adapt to common environmental challenges in 
similar ways but will fashion any adaptations to fit pre-existing institutions. 
 
Factors influencing the provision of occupational pensions 
 
Before we can assess the role of occupational pensions in the changing Japanese 
compensation systems, we first need to consider the factors that influence firms to 
provide such benefits. 
First, a major motive to pay occupational pensions is to influence the 
recruitment, retention as well as retirement of workers (Bridgen and Meyer 2005). 
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According to Logue and Rader (1998) there is no definitive theory or robust empirical 
research that would indicate why certain types of pension plans are favoured over 
others, but a common assumption is that the choice is influenced by considerations of 
employer-specific human capital. Firms that rely heavily on company-specific 
knowledge are likely to adopt defined benefit (DB) plans with back-loaded final-pay 
formulas where workers have an incentive to sustain their efforts over the entire 
career so that they can achieve high career-end salaries. In a DB plan, employees 
receive a promise of an eventual pension benefit that is determined by a pre-specified 
pension formula that typically reflects a worker’s age, pay, and/or service levels. The 
formula is usually one of three general types (EBRI 2009):  
a) a flat-benefit formula pays a flat amount for each year of service; 
b) a career-average formula pays a benefit that equals a percentage of the career-
average pay multiplied with a certain number of years of service; 
c) a final-pay formula pays benefits based on average earnings during a specified 
number of years at the end of a worker’s career with the benefit equalling a 
percentage of the worker’s final average earnings multiplied by the number of 
service years. 
The major advantage of DB plans from an employee’s perspective is that they provide 
a stable replacement rate of final income. As real wages change, employers have to 
adjust their funding rates and bear thus the investment risks in these plans. 
In contrast, companies that rely stronger on workers with specialist knowledge 
from the external labor market are more likely to prefer defined contribution (DC) 
plans that are not as heavily back-loaded and easier portable if an employee changes 
jobs (Bodie et al. 1988). In a DC plan, employers make provision for periodic 
contribution payments into an account that is established for each participating 
employee. Depending on underlying regulations, contributions can be made either by 
the employer, the employee or both parties. The final benefits are a reflection of the 
total of all contributions and any investment gains or losses. Benefits are thus not 
specified in advance and the employer does not shoulder any investment risk. 
 A third plan type are cash balance (CB) plans, which are legally DB plans but 
are designed to look like a DC plan with individual ‘hypothetical’ accounts. These 
members’ accounts grow by annual pay credits and an interest credit at either a fixed 
rate or a variable rate linked to an index such as the government bond rate. Employer 
contributions can be credited in several ways, for example as a fixed amount, a fixed 
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percentage of earnings or, as is now frequently the case in Japan, through a point 
system that links factors like “job grade”, “abilities”, “number of years of 
employment” or “performance” to specific pay credits. Just like in a DB plan, the 
investment risks and rewards on CB plan assets are borne solely by the employer. 
However, if the plan has a variable rate, the employer’s risk is more limited.  
 Second, government regulation has a major influence on employers’ 
motivation to provide retirement benefit schemes (Logue and Rader 1998). Certain 
kind of policies can make such schemes attractive to both sponsors and employees by 
providing a favourable tax treatment that result in deferred or even permanently 
reduced taxes.  
 Third, an important factor influencing the likelihood of employer provision of 
occupational pensions is the size of a business establishment. This argument assumes 
that because of economies of scale larger companies have more resources available 
for occupational benefits (Bridgen and Meyer 2005; Rein 1996).  
Forth, employers might use pension schemes as a means to preserve industrial 
peace vis-à-vis the trade unions (Esping-Andersen 1996; Bridgen and Meyer 2005). 
 And finally, the macro-economic and ideological environment plays an 
important role to the effect that economic ‘boom’ periods have been associated with 
the growth of occupational pension provision, whereas economic slumps 
accompanied with ideological turns toward neo-liberalism and shareholder value 
ideology have been associated with cost-cutting measures (Bridgen and Meyer 2005; 
Cutler and Waine 2001). 
 In the US and the UK, as two major representatives of liberal market 
economies, the varying influence of these factors has led to considerable changes in 
occupational pension provision over the last 20 years. In both countries DB plans 
have steadily lost in importance as the preferred plan type. In the US, the number of 
DC participants outstripped the number of DB plan participants in 1984 (U.S. 
Department of Labor 2008). In 2005, the ratio of participants among those workers 
who were covered by occupational pensions stood at 10% in DB plans, 63% in DC 
plans, and 27% in combined DB and DC plans (EBRI 2007). In the UK, the number 
of active members in open private sector DB plans has also fallen dramatically from 
4.1 million in 2000 to 1.3 million in 2007, while the membership in DC plans 
remained constant at 0.8 million over the same period (Office for National Statistics 
2008). Those DB plans that still operate in the US and UK use predominantly final-
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pay or career-average formulas (Office for National Statistics 2008; U.S. Bureau of 
Labor Statistics 2006). 
As explanations for the retrenchment of DB plans in the US and UK the 
literature confirms the importance of the above listed factors: Government regulation 
has raised the administrative costs of DB plans absolutely and relatively in 
comparison with DC plans, especially for smaller employers (Hustead 1998), while 
the attractiveness of DB plans as tax shelters has decreased (Warshawsky 1995). 
Employers have found that DC plans (where contributions are often linked to profits) 
are a better reflection of their organizational philosophy (Campbell 1996), and 
employees, against the backdrop of frequent job changes, show a stronger desire for 
direct ownership of their retirement accounts in DC plans (Ostaszewski 2001). Finally, 
increased cost pressures and a trend towards leaner organizations (VanDerhei and 
Copeland 2001) as well as the volatility of financial markets have increased the 
relative attractiveness of DC plans versus DB plans for employers (Ostaszewski 2001). 
How these factors have played out in Japan will be examined in the remainder 
of this article. 
 
Overview of pre-reform retirement benefit systems and pressures for reform 
 
Prior to new legislation which was enacted in 2001/2002, Japanese occupational 
retirement benefit systems were largely of the defined-benefit type: internally 
managed lump-sum payments through Book-Reserve Plans (BRPs) and externally 
managed annuities or lump-sum payments from Tax-Qualified Pension Plans (TQPP) 
or Employee Pension Funds (EPF). DC plans were not tax-advantaged and companies 
split their retirement benefits frequently between BRPs (which were attractive as a 
source for internal capital for reinvestments) and TQPPs or EPFs (which were 
comparatively more attractive in terms of their tax treatment) (Estévez-Abe 2008; 
informants # 14, # 15, #16). EPFs have a semi-public character as they are closely 
linked with the public Employees’ Pension System by substituting a part of the public 
pension in return for lower social security contributions with the rebate rate. 
The depressed stock market and declining interest rates following the burst of 
the bubble economy in the early 1990s contributed to a rapid increase in underfunding 
of the prevailing DB plans. Data from the Pension Fund Association show that in the 
period 1989-2003, the average return on assets managed by EPFs was just 2% in 
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nominal terms, while the government set guaranteed rate was 5.5% (Kigyō Nenkin 
Rengōkai 2003). Furthermore, new accounting standards that were introduced in April 
2000 made these unfunded pension liabilities for the first time visible on companies’ 
balance sheets (Kigyō Nenkin Kenkyūkai 2007; Shiniapuran Kaihatsu Kikō 2004; 
informants #1, #4, #14, #15, #16).  
In response to these problems, firms lobbied for new benefit options and 
options to leave the EPFs, which were finally granted by the 2001/2002 pension 
reform laws that introduced the following options (Kigyō Nenkin Kenkyūkai 2007; 
informants #1, #6, #16):  
• return of assets of the EPFs related to the contracted-out portion of the 
public Employees’ Pension Insurance back to the government (put-
back); 
• establishment and benefit transfer to new types of DC, CB, and DB 
plans that are not intertwined with the public pension system; 
• scheduled elimination of TQPPs until 2012. 
Findings 
 
General trend in occupational pension provision 
 
The mix of retirement benefits offered by companies has changed significantly since 
the 2001/2002 reforms, while overall employee coverage has declined. In 1997, 
99.5% of firms with more than 1,000 employees paid retirement benefits, while this 
percentage decreased slightly to 95.2% in 2008. Today, 84% of Japanese companies 
with more than 30 employees pay retirement benefits (Kōseirōdōshō 2008), which 
make up 6.8% of total labour costs in manufacturing (JILPT 2008). The number of 
active participants has declined from 20.1 million in 2001 to 17 million in 2007. 
Despite lower employee coverage in absolute terms, DB benefits remain, in relative 
terms, the dominant form of retirement benefit (Figure 1). 
 
Figure 1 here 
 
While the number of EPFs and TQPPS has declined substantially since the 
early 2000s, these plans were to a large extent compensated for by newly introduced 
DB and DC plans (Table 1).  
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Table 1 here 
 
From the 1,737 EPFs with 10.87 million participants in 2001, only 620 plans 
with 4.8 million members remained in 2008. About 50% of former EPFs were 
converted into new DB plans, a process during which the companies returned their 
obligations for the contracted-out portion of the public Employees’ Pension Insurance 
back to the government (Kōseirōdōshō Nenkinkyoku 2009). This has had the effect to 
remove large pension liabilities from corporate balance sheets (Sato 2005) and has 
fundamentally altered the state-enterprise welfare mix since almost all large 
companies have now left the semi-public EPFs, with only smaller companies 
remaining. 
Given the scheduled elimination of TQPPs until 2012, it is not surprising that 
these plans, which are most dominant among smaller firms, have also experienced a 
significant decline since the 2001/2002 reforms.  Both in terms of the number of plans 
and participants, TQPPs have declined by over 50%. However, just like in the case of 
the EPFs, many of these schemes were transferred into the newly available types of 
DB or DC plans. 
The most significant development with regards to medium and large-sized 
companies, which are the focus of this article, is that they have largely left the semi-
public EPFs and have replaced those plans with multi-layered retirement benefit 
systems that offer a combination of DB (usually 75-90% of total benefits) and DC 
benefits (usually 10-25% of total benefits). In contrast, over 50% of companies with 
less than 300 employees offer now only DC plans (Table 2).  
 
Table 2 here 
 
As will be discussed in more detail below, the newly emerging multi-layered 
retirement benefit systems in many medium and large-sized companies show a 
growing diversity in terms of their benefit mix (with different percentages of DB 
and/or DC and/or CB benefits) and in their use of benefit formulas. 
Assessing the changes over the last decade 
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To understand the recent changes, the importance of the historical legacy of Japanese 
occupational pensions can hardly be overestimated. All of the informants agreed that 
current developments could only be understood with explicit reference to the system 
of lump-sum retirement payments (BRPs) and underlying entrenched views that 
retirement benefits, regardless of their financing mode as BRPs, TQPPS or EPFs, 
have so far been considered a form of deferred wage. This social consensus has 
functioned as a departure point for management and labour and is one important 
explanatory factor for the resilience of DB benefits. It is also for this reason that the 
overall contribution levels in the new retirement systems are commonly not lower 
than in the old ones. As will be analysed below, companies have succeeded in shifting 
some of the investment risks to employees by increasing the DC portions of 
retirement packages and they have also succeeded in linking benefits stronger to 
performance indicators. However, survey results indicate that companies’ contribution 
levels for those participants that continue to be covered have remained unchanged 
(Shiniapuran Kaihatsu Kikō 2004). 
 
Role of the labour unions 
 
Although the Japanese labour unions did not involve themselves deeply in the 
discussions leading up to the 2001/2002 reforms (informants #1, #4), the resulting 
legal framework supports strongly their position since any transfers from the old DB 
to the new DC systems have to be agreed by a high proportion of the participants and 
the enterprise unions. Depending on the extent of such transfers between two-thirds 
and three-quarters of the participants as well as the labour unions representing more 
than one third of the participants have to agree (NRKS and KNMKN 2008). These 
stringent standards have certainly limited the possibilities of companies to conduct 
single-handedly far-reaching reforms. Furthermore, the Japanese Trade Union 
Federation, which consults individual enterprise unions, takes in principal a negative 
stance towards the introduction of DC plans (informants #1, #8, #9).  
However, in some sectors like electric machines, represented by the Japanese 
Federation of Electric Machine Workers’ Unions, the arrival of DC pensions was in 
fact welcomed as a positive development (informant #12). Overall, Japanese unions 
have not categorically blocked occupational pension reform at the company level. In 
many cases, they have cooperated with management and eventually agreed to the 
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(partial) introduction of DC pensions (informants #2, #4, #7, #8, #9, #11, #12, #13, 
#14, #15, #17, #19). None of my informants could recall cases in which company 
unions had fundamentally opposed such reforms. Several informants stated that the 
labour unions had usually compromised on the pension issue in return for, in the 
unions’ view, more important issues such as job security or the maintenance of a 
corporate pension system as such (informants #1, #7, #8, #9, #13, #14). These 
findings confirm the overall trend of diminishing Japanese union power, as it has been 
confirmed by other studies (e.g. Jacoby 2005). 
 
Roles of historic practices and government regulation 
 
Some foreign observers have claimed that the resilience of Japanese DB plans is the 
result of low tax-advantaged contribution ceilings. According to Huh and McLellan 
(2007, p. 10), “the low contribution caps set forth in the DC legislation prevented 
many Japanese firms from fully converting their existing DB plans to DC plans, so 
some firms turned instead to Cash Balance (CB) plans.” However, based on the 
available statistical material and the assessment of the informants, I would argue that 
this statement does not fully reflect the complexity of the issue. 
It is true that the DC law is rather inflexible and prevents an unlimited transfer 
to DC plans because it does not allow companies to pay voluntarily taxable 
contributions beyond the tax-free amounts. Since contributions are in most cases paid 
as a percentage of wages, which increase still very much in line with tenure, it is 
usually the contributions of older workers that can reach the maximum contribution 
ceilings. Accordingly, many companies have adopted overall contribution rates that 
allow their highest wage earners to stay within these ceilings (informants #3, #4, #7, 
#10, #19).  
In practice, however, only 29% (2007) of DC plans have chosen amounts that 
reach the legal maximum contributions (Kigyō Nenkin Rengōkai 2008). In other 
words, 70% of companies seem not be directly affected by the tax framework. 
According to several informants, this underlines that the corporate commitment to DB 
benefits is real and not solely a function of the tax framework. According to this view, 
DB pensions are widely regarded as a tax-advantaged way to manage externally what 
used to be internally managed lump sum benefits (BRP). Higher tax ceilings for DC 
pensions would not address the fundamental problem that DC pensions are not a 
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suitable vehicle to replace DB-type lump sum benefits (informants #2, #3, #6, #7, #12, 
#13, #15).  
However, other informants voiced the opinion that the contribution ceilings 
are posing a problem and that many larger companies would in fact like to transfer 
more DB into DC benefits (informants #10, #11, #16, #17, #19; Nihon Keizai 
Shinbun 20 June 2008). The business community has been requesting higher 
contribution ceilings for some years now and a slight increase is scheduled for 2010. 
Any major increases or the adoption of a tax framework considering lifetime 
contributions like in the UK seem, however, unlikely (informants #4). 
Another regulatory requirement of the DC law is that if a company wants to 
transfer not only future but also accrued past benefit obligations from DB plans to DC 
plans, it has to first fully fund those obligations. Given the difficult financial state of a 
large number of DB plans, many companies have therefore limited their transfers to 
future benefit obligations (informant #4). 
Yet another regulatory factor contributing indirectly to the continued 
popularity of DB plans is the comparatively ‘softer’ protection of their benefits if 
compared to the US and UK. While in the US and UK companies must ultimately 
deliver on the retirement promise, companies in Japan may reduce DB benefits when 
the sponsor is in financial difficulties and labour and management agree to a benefit 
reduction (Pensions & Investments 2007; informants #4, #7). Compared to their 
Western counterparts, Japanese executives feel presumably less pressure to convert to 
DC plans. In addition, many Japanese companies have converted their retirement 
benefit systems fully or partially to CB plans, which allow for risk sharing between 
the employer and employee since pension obligations develop in line with interest rate 
developments so that sinking interest rates do not lead to rising pension obligations 
that have to be recognized on companies’ balance sheets (informants #4, #7, #11, #12; 
Shiniapuran Kaihatsu Kikō 2004).  
To sum up, the regulatory environment has undoubtedly had a considerable 
impact on the way companies have restructured their pension plans since 2001/2002 
and explains to a certain extent the continued popularity of DB plans. However, many 
of the informants stated that these factors alone could not explain the resilience of DB 
plans. Instead, another key explanatory factor appears to be corporate commitment to 
established employment practices for the regular labour force, paternalistic employer-
employee relations, and a strong believe in the equal treatment of regular workers 
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(informants #2, #3, #7, #15, #20, #21, #22). This becomes clearer when we consider 
next for whom and how companies have adopted the new DC plans. 
 
Changes in employee coverage and benefit structure 
 
In terms of pension coverage, US and UK companies distinguish frequently between 
groups of employees such as incumbent workers vs. new entrees, blue collar vs. white 
collar workers, or managerial vs. non-managerial workers. For example, in the UK it 
is now a frequent practice to offer new employees only DC plans, if at all, leaving the 
existing DB plans to be available solely to the incumbent employees. However, in 
Japan, all informants concurred that the single most important criterion for coverage 
continues to be the distinction between regular and non-regular workers. 
In many cases where companies are now operating more than one 
occupational pension plan, and where they have adopted DC plans in addition to the 
existing DB plans (47% of large companies), they have usually done this by partially 
replacing former DB benefits by DC and/or CB benefits. In large companies the 
percentage of DC benefits within the total retirement benefit package varies usually 
between 10%-25% (informants #12, #13, #14, #19). The resulting combined schemes 
are uniformly applied to all regular workers while the growing ranks of non-regular 
workers, whose percentage in the Japanese labour force has increased substantially 
from 20.1% in 1994 to 33.2% in 2006 (JILPT 2009), are commonly not covered by 
any occupational pension scheme (informants #2, #3, #4, #1, #14, #15, #16, #18, #19, 
#20, #21, #22).1 
Through the restructuring of the overall benefit mix, Japanese companies have 
thus largely maintained comprehensive retirement benefit packages for their core 
workers. At the same time they have achieved risk and cost reductions by relying 
stronger on DC and CB benefits, by increasing the number of non-regular workers 
and, as will be discussed below, by linking retirement benefits closer to performance 
indicators. 
 
Linkages between retirement benefits and employee performance 
 
In 1981, 84.7% of Japanese companies with more than 30 employees used a final-pay 
formula for the calculation of their lump-sum benefits (DGHJKSKSK 2008). This 
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method reflected strongly the seniority orientation of Japanese pay systems but did 
not account for performance contributions and discriminated against mid-career entry 
(Sano 2007). Since then the final-pay formula has continuously lost importance. By 
2008 only 58.5% of firms employed it, while 45.8% were using different methods 
such as ‘point systems’ (18.6%), ‘special table systems’ (13.2%), or ‘fixed amount 
systems’ (10.3%) (DGHJKSKSK 2008). One of the key functions of these systems is 
to weaken or extinguish the influence of regular pay rises on the calculation of 
retirement benefits (informants #1, #2, #3, #7, #18, #19). 
  The increasing use of point systems is particularly noteworthy with regard to 
the growing importance of performance-related pay practices as highlighted in the 
literature review. Although the available Japanese statistics focus on the calculation of 
lump-sum benefits, it is clear that point systems have also been widely adopted among 
pension plans, including the new CB plans (Sano 2007; informants #4, #12, #14, #15, 
#17, #18, #19). According to the 2008 General Survey of Employment Conditions, 
55.2% of companies with more than 1000 employees are now using such point 
systems (Kōseirōdōshō 2008). 
In these systems, employees accumulate a certain number of points which can 
reflect a combination of factors like “job grade”, “abilities”, “number of years of 
employment” and “performance”. These points are then multiplied with a certain cash 
value and the resulting amount is accumulated with a fixed (or in the case of CB plans 
flexible) interest until retirement (Sano 2007; informant #12).  
It is important to note that the presence of a point system as such does not 
necessarily imply that performance factors are taken into account, but in so far as 
larger companies have been moving towards stronger performance-oriented pay 
practices in recent years, many large companies’ point systems tend to reflect at least 
partially performance indicators (informants #4, #6, #7, #12, #13; Ogoshi 2006; see 
also the example from Panasonic below). 
Informants from a large automobile manufacturer stated that their company 
had totally abolished factors like “numbers of years of employment” in 2001 and is 
now using a competency-based approach linked to a point system for both wages and 
pensions. This company has also totally abolished its BRP and pays 25% of 
retirement benefits as DC and 75% as DB benefits (informants #12, #13). In the 
electronics industry the most common approaches are now point systems where the 
number of monthly accumulated points depends on the position in a grid of job grades 
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and point systems where a certain percentage of the bi-annual bonus, which partially 
reflects individual performance evaluations, is accumulated as a company pension 
(informant #15). A similar approach has been adopted by a medium-sized electronic 
components manufacturer with 200 regular workers. Just like many large companies, 
this firm operates since 2003 one of the commonly found multi-layered retirement 
benefits systems with externally managed CB and DC plans and an internally 
managed BRP. While the CB and DC benefits are linked to a point system reflecting 
the position in a grid of job grades, individual performance evaluations are reflected 
in retirement allowances build up through a BRP (informants #18, #19). 
A good example how changes in retirement benefits are implemented, is the 
electronics giant Panasonic (formerly Matsushita). In 2002, immediately after this 
option became available, Panasonic left the semi-public EPF. Up until then retirement 
benefits (consisting of a lump-sum and an EPF pension) were primarily a reflection of 
age and length of service as part of a final salary system. Beginning in 2002, 
Panasonic started to operate a multi-layered retirement benefit system (Figure 2).  
 
Figure 2 
 
For the first tier it adopted a point system, which reflects both individual 
performance evaluations and the position of employees in a grid system of ‘work 
groups’, linking this point system to benefits paid through a DB plan. As a second tier 
it introduced a CB plan, whose benefits were linked to the development of employees’ 
base pay. As a third tier it maintained a lump-sum benefit for employees retiring 
between 50-60 years of age. Other large companies, adopting similar complex 
pension systems include, for example, Tokyo Electric Power Corporation and 
Daihatsu Motor Corporation (Nihon Keizai Shinbun 20 June 2008). 
Concluding remarks 
 
This article has discussed significant changes that occupational pension plans in Japan 
have undergone since the early 2000s. The most important factors driving these 
changes were underfunding problems caused by depressed stock markets and changes 
in accounting standards that made underfunding problems apparent. Utilizing new 
legal options, Japanese companies have achieved cost and risk reductions through the 
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partial replacement of DB benefits by CB and/or DC benefits and through an increase 
in the ratio of workers that are not covered by any retirement benefits. However, 
compared to recent developments in the US and UK, Japanese DB plans show a 
relatively strong resilience. After seven years since the introduction of DC plans, only 
16% of occupational pension participants are covered by these schemes. A variety of 
factors contribute to this finding. While explicit and strong union pressure for the 
continued use of DB plans is lacking, government regulation and entrenched views 
among employees and employers about the nature and purpose of retirement benefits 
have been shown to be crucial explanatory factors. The evolving multi-layered 
structure of many companies’ retirement benefit systems, comprising both DB and 
DC benefits, is mirrored by an increasing complexity in other parts of Japanese pay 
systems, where a performance-related pay component is often added as another layer 
to existing pay components. Accordingly, Japanese firms now have some of the most 
complex pay determination systems in the world (Morishima 2002). In the 
occupational pension field, this complexity can be explained as a result of regulatory 
constraints, on the one hand, and as a purposeful attempt to limit companies’ risks and 
costs while maintaining at least partially the employers’ responsibility for the social 
welfare of their core workforce, on the other hand. While companies have sustained 
pension benefits for these regular workers, they have at the same time increased the 
ratio of non-regular workers that are not eligible for these benefits.  
 With regard to the convergence/non-convergence debate these findings offer 
important insights. While DB plans have lost some of their importance in Japan, 
mirroring similar changes in the US and UK, this trend should not be mistaken as 
evidence for convergent developments. In contrast to the US and UK, where DB plans 
have decreased dramatically and where the remaining plans employ primarily career-
average or final-pay formulas, DB benefits show a much stronger resilience in Japan 
where companies have controlled costs by employing benefit formulas that do no 
longer reflect automatic wage increases but employees’ performance factors. These 
findings stress the important influence of regulatory systems and social constraints 
and confirm the argument of path-dependent developments that thwart international 
convergence. Furthermore, it can be argued that these constraints, whether real or 
perceived, have shaped the institutional innovation of the newly evolving multi-
layered retirement systems in Japan.  
 
 19
Acknowledgments 
 
This research was supported by funding from the Great Britain Sasakawa Foundation. 
I would also like to thank my informants, the reviewer and the following persons for 
their support and comments on earlier versions of this paper: Miki Arimori, Pauline 
Dibben, Hugo Dobson, Peter Matanle, Tadashi Nakada, Geoffrey Wood.  
 
 
References 
 
Abegglen, J.C. (1958), The Japanese Factory, Glencoe, IL: Free Press. 
 
Aoki, M. 1988, Information, Incentives and Bargaining in the Japanese Economy,  
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Aoki, M., Jackson, G. and Miyajima, H. (2007), Corporate Governance in Japan: 
Institutional Change and Organizational Diversity, Oxford: Oxford University 
Press. 
 
Bodie, Z., Marcus, A.J., and Merton, R.C. (1988), ‘Defined Benefit versus Defined 
Contribution Pension Plans: What are the Real Trade-offs?’ in Pensions in the 
U.S. Economy, eds. Bodie, Z., Marcus, A.J., and Merton, R.C., Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, pp. 139-162. 
 
Bridgen, P. and Meyer, T. (2005), ‘When do Benevolent Capitalists Change Their 
Mind? Explaining the Retrenchment of Defined-benefit Pensions in Britain,’ 
Social Policy & Administration, 39, 7, 764-785. 
 
Campbell, S. (1996), ‘Hybrid Retirement Plans: The Retirement Income System 
Continues to Evolve,’ EBRI Issue Brief, 171, March. 
 
Conrad, Harald (2010), ‘From Seniority to Performance Principle – The Evolution of 
Pay Practices in Japanese Firms since the 1990s,’ Social Science Japan 
Journal, 13, 1, 115-135. 
 
Cutler, T. and Waine, B. (2001), ‘Social Insecurity and the Retreat from Social 
Democracy: Occupational Welfare in the Long Boom and Financialisation,’ 
Review of International Political Economy, 18, 1, 96-118. 
 
Debroux, Philippe (2003), Human Resource Management in Japan: Changes and 
Uncertainties, Hampshire: Ashgate. 
 
Degg, R. and Jackson, G. (2007), ‘The State of the Art – Towards a More Dynamic 
Theory of Capitalist Variety,’ Socio-Economic Review, 5, 149-179. 
 
 20
Dore, R. (2000), Stock Market Capitalism – Welfare Capitalism: Japan and Germany 
versus the Anglo-Saxons, Oxford: Oxford University Press.  
 
DGHJKSKSK (Dokuritsu Gyōsei Hōjin Jinkō Kōrei ·  Shōgaisha Koyō Shien Kikō) 
(2008), Kōrei Shakai Tōkei Yōran [Statistical Handbook on the Aging 
Society], Tokyo: DGHJKSKSK. 
 
EBRI (Employee Benefit Research Institute)(2007), Facts from EBRI: Retirement 
trends in the United States over the past quarter-century Online at: 
http://www.ebri.org/pdf/publications/facts/0607fact.pdf 
 
EBRI (Employee Benefit Research Institute)(2009), Fundamentals of Employee 
Benefit Programs Online at: 
http://www.ebri.org/publications/books/index.cfm?fa=fundamentals 
 
Esping-Andersen, G. (1996), ‘Conclusion: Occupational Welfare in the Social Policy 
Nexus,’ in The Privatization of Social Policy? Occupational Welfare and the 
Welfare State in America, Scandinavia and Japan, ed. M. Shalev, 
Basingstoke: Macmillan, pp. 327-338. 
 
Estévez-Abe, M. (2008), Welfare and Capitalism in Postwar Japan, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press.  
 
Fukuda, E. (2002), Matushita Denki Sangyō Kabushiki Gaisha - Taishokukin · Nenkin 
Seido no Kaite ni Tsuite [On the Revision of the Retirement Benefit and 
Pension System at Matsushita], Online at: http://www.ier.hit-
u.ac.jp/jprc/soukai2002/fukuda-ppt.pdf  
 
Hall, P.A. and Soskice, D. (2001), ‘An Introduction to Varieties of Capitalism,’ in 
Varieties of Capitalism: The Institutional Foundations of Comparative 
Advantage, eds. Hall, P.A. and Soskice, D., Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
pp. 1-68. 
 
Hollingsworth, J.R. and Boyer, R. (1997), Contemporary Capitalism: The 
Embeddedness of Institutions, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Huh. E. and McLellan, S. (2007), ‘A Tale of Two Pension Reforms: A US-Japan 
Comparison,’ Pension Research Council Working Paper 2007-01.  
 
Husted, E.C. (1998), ‘Trends in Retirement Income Plan Administrative Expenses,’ in 
Living with Defined Contribution Pensions, eds. Mitchell, O.S. and Schieber, 
S.J., Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, pp.    
 
Inagami, T. and Whittaker, D.H (2005), The New Community Firm, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
 
Jackson, G. and Miyajima, H. (2007), ‘Introduction: The Diversity and Change of 
Corporate Governance in Japan,’ in Corporate Governance in Japan: 
Institutional Change and Organizational Diversity, eds. Aoki, M., Jackson, G., 
and Miyajima, H., Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 1-47. 
 21
 
Jacoby, S. M. (2005), The Embedded Corporation: Corporate Governance and 
Employment Relations in Japan and the United States, Princeton: Princeton 
University Press.  
 
JILPT (The Japan Institute for Labour Policy and Training) (2008), Japanese Working 
Life Profile 2008/2009, Tokyo: JILPT. 
 
JILPT (The Japan Institute for Labour Policy and Training) (2009), Labor Situation in 
Japan and Analysis: Detailed Exposition 2009/2010, Tokyo: JILPT. 
 
Katz, H.C. and Darbishire, O. (2000), Converging Divergencies: Worldwide Changes 
in Employment Systems, Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press. 
 
Keizer, A.B. (2009), ‘Transformations In- and Outside the Internal Labour Market: 
Institutional Change and Continuity in Japanese Employment Practices,’ 
International Journal of Human Resource Management, 20, 7, 1521-1535. 
 
Kerr, C., Dunlop, J.T., Harbison, F.H. and Myers, C.A. (1962) Industrialism and 
Industrial Man: The Problems of Labour and Management in Economic 
Growth, London: Heinemann Education. 
 
Kigyō Nenkin Kenkyūkai (2007), Kigyō Nenkin Seido no Shikō Jōkyō no Kenshō 
Kekka - An - Shiryō 1 [Results from a Review into the Enforcement of the 
Corporate Pension System - Proposal - Material no.1], Tokyo: Kōseirōdōshō. 
10 July. 
 
Kigyō Nenkin Kenkyūkai (2008), Tekikaku Taishoku Nenkin no Ikō no Genjō Oyobi 
Torikumi - Shiryō 2 [The Current Situation of the Transfer of the Tax-
Qualified Pension Plans – Material no. 2], Tokyo: Kōseirōdōshō. 21 October. 
 
Kigyō Nenkin Rengōkai (2003, 2008), Kigyō Nenkin ni kan suru Kiso Shiryō [Basic 
Data about Corporate Pensions], Tokyo: Kigyō Nenkin Rengōkai. 
 
Kōseirōdōshō (1997, 2003, 2008), Jurō Jōken Sōgō Chōsa [1997, 2003, 2008 General 
Survey of Employment Conditions], Tokyo: Kōseirōdōshō. 
 
Kōseirōdōshō Nenkinkyoku (2009), Kigyō Nenkin Seido – Heisei 21-nen 4-gatsu, 13-
nichi [The Occupational Pension System 13 April 2009], Tokyo: Internal 
document. 
 
Lane, C. (1995), Industry and Society in Europe: Stability and Change in Britain, 
Germany and France, Aldershot: Edward Elgar. 
 
Life Design Kenkyūjo (2000), Heisei 12-nenban Kigyō Nenkin Hakusho - 
[Occupational Pension White Paper 2000], Tokyo: Life Design Kenkyūjo. 
 
Logue, D.E. and Rader, J.S. (1998), Managing Pension Plans – A Comprehensive 
Guide to Improving Plan Performance, Boston: Harvard Business School 
Press.  
 22
 
Mayrhofer, W. and Brewster, C. (2005), ‘European Human Resource Management: 
Researching Developments over Time,’ Management Revue, 16, 1, 36-62. 
 
Morishima, M. (2002), ‘Pay Practices in Japanese Organizations: Changes and Non-
changes,’ Japan Labour Bulletin, 41, 4, 8-13. 
 
Nakamura, K. (2006), Seika Shugi no Jijitsu [The Truth About Performance-based 
Pay], Tokyo: Tōyō Keizai Shinpōsha. 
 
Nihon Keizai Shinbun (20 June 2008), ‘Firms Pursue More Affordable, Sustainable 
Pension Schemes.’ 
 
Nomura Research Institute (2007), Japan’s Asset Management Business (Summary), 
Lakyara Vol. 28. 
 
NRKS and KNMKN (Nihon Rōdō Kumiai Sōrengōkai and Kinyū Nenkin Mondai 
Kyōiku Nettowaku) (2008), Taishokukin · Kigyō Nenkin Seido Ikō Taiō 
Handobukku 2009-nenpan [Handbook for the Response to Transfers of the 
Lump-sum Payment and the Occupational Pension System], Tokyo: Nihon 
Rōdō Kumiai Sōrengōkai. 
 
NRSKKK (Nihon Rōdō Seisaku Kenkyū Kenshū Kikō) (2006), ‘Gendai Nihon Kigyō 
no Jinzai Manejimento,’ [The contemporary management of Japanese 
companies], Rōdō Seisaku Kenkyū Hokokusho No. 61. 
 
Office for National Statistics (2008), Occupational Pension Schemes Annual Report, 
Newport: Office for National Statistics. 
 
Ogoshi, Y. (2006), ‘Current Japanese Employment Practices and Industrial Relations: 
The Transformation of Permanent Employment and Seniority-Based Wage 
System,’ Asian Business and Management, 5, 469-485. 
 
Ostaszewski, K. (2001), ‘Macroeconomic Aspects of Private Retirement Programs,’ 
North American Actuarial Journal, July, 52-64. 
 
Pensions & Investments (2007), ‘Japan Could Avoid Path of Defined Contribution 
Shift.’ 24 December 2007. 
 
Rein, M. (1996), ‘Is America Exceptional? The Role of Occupational Welfare in the 
United States and the European Community,’ in The Privatization of Social 
Policy? Occupational Welfare and the Welfare State in America, Scandinavia 
and Japan, ed. M. Shaley, Basingstoke: Macmillan, pp. 27-43. 
 
Sano, K. (2007), ‘Kigyō Nenkin Seido de Wakaru Jinji Senryaku,’ [Understanding the 
human resource strategy from the occupational pension system] in Kigyō 
Nenkin no Gabanansu, ed. H. Morito, H., Tokyo: Chūō Keizai, pp.  27-54. 
 
Sato, M. (2005), ‘2007 Problems Loom Large,’ Daily Yomiuri. 30 July. 
 
 23
Shibata, H. (2000), ‘The Transformation of the Wage and Performance Appraisal  
System in a Japanese firm,’ International Journal of Human Resource 
Management, 11, 2, 294-313. 
 
Shiniapuran Kaihatsu Kikō (2004), Taishokukin – Kigyō Nenkin Seido Kaikaku no 
Shinchoku Jōkyō to Kongo no Hōkō ni Kan Suru Chōsa Kenkyū [Research 
Report on the Progress and Future Direction of Retirement Benefits and 
Occupational Pensions], Tokyo: Shinapuran Kaihatsu Kikō. 
 
Suda, T. (2007), ‘Converging or Still Diverging? A Comparison of Pay systems in the 
UK and Japan,’ International Journal of Human Resource Management, 18, 4, 
568-601. 
 
U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (2006), Defined Benefit Retirement Plans – Selected 
Features, Online at: 
http://www.census.gov/compendia/statab/tables/09s0534.xls 
 
U.S. Department of Labor (2008), Private Pension Plan Bulletin Historical Tables, 
Online at: 
http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/pdf/privatepensionplanbulletinhistoricaltables.pdf 
 
VanDerhei, J. and Copeland, C. (2001), ‘The Changing Face of Private Retirement 
Plans,’ EBRI Issue Brief, 232, April. 
 
Vogel, S.K. (2006), Japan Remodeled, Ithaca: Cornell University Press. 
 
Warshawsky, M.J. (1995), ‘Determinants of Pension Plan Formations and 
Terminations,’ Benefits Quarterly, 4, 71-80. 
 
Whitely, R. (1999), Divergent Capitalisms – The Social Structuring and Change of 
Business Systems, Oxford: Oxford University Press.  
 
Wood, G.; Brewster, C.; Johnson, P. and Brookes, M. (2009), ‘The Antecedents of 
Comparative Differences in Collective Bargaining,’ Working Paper, School of 
Management, University of Sheffield. 
 
 24
Appendix: Lists of informants 
 
 Position Affiliation 
#1 Executive chief researcher Research institute affiliated with a 
major labour union organization 
#2 Actuary  Federation of Workers and 
Consumers Insurance 
Cooperatives 
#3 Professor & pension expert National university 
#4 General manager, chief researcher & 
actuary 
Pension research institute of a 
major financial institution 
#5 Managing director & actuary Pension consultancy 
#6 High-ranking civil servant  in pension 
department 
Ministry of Health, Labour and 
Welfare 
#7 Senior research fellow & actuary Major think tank 
#8 Section chief of welfare policy division Labour union organization 
#9 Executive director of welfare policy 
division 
“ 
#10 Head of group HR planning department “ 
#11 Professor & HR expert Private university 
#12 Expert leader of global pension 
management & actuary 
Major automobile manufacturer 
#13 Manager in compensation and benefit 
group 
“ 
#14 Executive director of pension fund Major transport company 
#15 Executive director of pension fund Major electronics manufacturer 
#16 Chief advisor & pension expert Major think tank 
#17 Chief Researcher & pension expert Government-affiliated pension 
research institute 
#18 Representative director & president Medium-sized electronics 
manufacturer 
#19 Manager in general affairs/HR section “ 
#20 Director of human resources planning 
group 
Major regional utility company 
#21 Vice-director of human resources 
planning group 
“ 
#22 Vice-director of human resources 
planning group 
“ 
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Table 1: Indicators of Major Japanese Occupational Pension Plans (1998-2008) 
Name of Plan Nature of Plan Year Number of 
Plans  
Number of 
Members  
(in million) 
Amount of 
Assets  
(in trillion 
Yen) 
Employees Pension Fund 
Plans (EPF) 
 
DB 1998 
1999 
2000 
2001 
2002 
2003 
2004 
2005 
2006 
2007 
2008 
1,858 
1,832 
1,801 
1,737 
1,656 
1,357 
838 
687 
658 
626 
620 
12.00 
11.69 
11.39 
10.87 
10.38 
8.35 
6.15 
5.31 
5.25 
5.25 
4.80 
53.3 
62.2 
58.0 
57.0 
51.2 
48.6 
26.9 
24.7 
23.9 
20.6  
… 
Tax Qualified Pension Plans 
(TQPP) 
 
DB  1998 
 1999 
 2000 
 2001 
2002 
2003 
2004 
2005 
2006 
 2007 
88,312 
85,047 
81,533 
78,148 
            73,582 
66,741 
59,162 
52,761 
45,090 
38,885 
10.29 
10.01 
9.68 
9.16 
8.58 
7.77 
6.54 
5.68 
5.06 
  4.43 
20.0 
21.2 
22.4 
22.6 
21.4 
20.7 
17.1 
17.2 
15.6 
 11.7 
Contract-Type DB Plan* DB 2001 
2002 
2003 
2004 
2005 
2006 
2007 
X 
15 
164 
478 
833 
1,335 
2,480 
X  
0.003 
1.35  
3.14 
3.84  
4.30 
5.06 
X 
… 
… 
8.1 
21.7 
33.0 
36.9 
Fund-Type DB Plan* DB 2001 
2002 
2003 
2004 
2005 
2006 
2007 
X 
0 
152 
514 
597 
605 
619 
X  
0.003 
1.35  
3.14 
3.84  
4.30 
5.06 
X 
… 
… 
8.1 
21.7 
33.0 
36.9 
Corporate DC Plan DC 2001 
2002 
2003 
2004 
2005 
2006 
2007 
2008 
70 
361 
845 
1,402 
1,866 
2,313 
2,710 
2,566 
0.088 
0.325 
0.708 
1.255 
1.733 
2.187 
2.711 
... 
… 
1.4 
5.6 
12.0 
22.8   
31.1 
36.5 
... 
Notes: X = not applicable; … = not available; *Numbers for members and amount of 
assets do not distinguish between contract-type and fund-type plans. 
Sources: Life Design Kenkyūjo 2000; Nomura Research Institute 2007; Kigyō Nenkin 
Kenkyūkai 2008; Kigyō Nenkin Rengōkai 2008. 
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Table 2: Occupational Pension Plans Offered in Addition to DC Plans (in %) 
 Less than 99 
employees 
100-299 
employees 
300-999 
employees 
Over 1000 
employees 
EPF 13.4 21.4 15.4 9.3 
TQPP 2.5 4.5 8.2 7.3 
DB-plan 8.2 15.4 25.1 47.0 
EPF/DB-plan 0.2 0.6 2.1 2.6 
EPF/TQPP 0.8 1.4 2.3 1.9 
TQPP/DB-plan 0.2 0.2 0.5 0.9 
Mutual Aid Ass. 
for School 
Teachers 
0.04 0.05 0.2 0.0 
NONE 74.7 56.3 46.3 31.0 
 
Number of 
corporations 
with DC-plans 
 
 
 
5,089 
 
 
 
2,024 
 
 
 
1,104 
 
 
 
645 
Source: Kigyō Nenkin Kenkyūkai 2008 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Occupational Pension Plan Participants (Relative and Absolute 
Numbers) 
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Figure 2: Panasonic’s Retirement Benefit System (since 2002) 
 
Source: based on Fukuda 2002 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1
 It should be noted that there are large differences in occupational pension coverage of regular workers 
depending on company size. While 80.7% of companies with more than 1,000 employees offer 
occupational pensions to those workers, this ratio drops considerably in smaller establishments: 69.3% 
(300-999 employees), 58.9% (100-299 employees), 37.0% (30-99 employees) (Kōseirōdōshō 2008). 
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